

VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBNS #2603 2080906
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 270906Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2690

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRUSSELS 002603

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2016

TAGS: [KNNP](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [AORC](#)
SUBJECT: BELGIAN RESPONSE TO P5+1 INCENTIVE PACKAGE FOR IRAN

REF: STATE 119436

¶1. (SBU) Summary. In response to reftel, Belgian MFA Nonproliferation chief Werner Bauwens believed the Iranians would accept the P5 1 proposal as a basis of negotiation in mid-late August, and at the same time voluntarily suspend an unspecified degree of enrichment activities. He also believes Russia will take a tougher line with Iran and confirmed that PM Verhofstadt's meeting with Ali Larijani yielded nothing new. End Summary

¶2. (SBU) Reftel demarche was delivered July 25 to Werner Bauwens, Director of non-Proliferation and Arms Control at the Belgian Foreign Ministry. In general, Bauwens reiterated Belgium remained fully in line with the P5 1. He stated Belgians main considerations are immediate cessation of nuclear enrichment activities and full access for IAEA inspectors. If a Chapter 7 resolution doesn't attract consensus in the UNSC, a resolution with reference to "threat to international peace and security" without specific legally binding reference to Chapter 7 might attract the Iranians attention without putting them into a corner. Any resolution should have reference to require suspension of enrichment, cooperation with IAEA, and call on all Member States to exercise vigilance on exports.

¶3. (C) Based on experience with Iranian negotiators, Bauwens' said he believed Iran would make a statement accepting the P5 1 package a basis for negotiation accompanied with a halt in some enrichment activities in-or-around the third week in August. The Iranians intend for this to be seen as an act of their own volition and carried out on their own terms. He was concerned an Iranian gesture seen as cooperative would prompt the Russians and Chinese to call for lessening of political pressure. He expects this will be a long slog through the UNSC.

¶4. (SBU) Bauwens believed the Russian Foreign Ministry has in the past been soft on Iran and seemingly unwilling to press the issue. Putin, on the other hand, has a more realistic view of Iranian situation, and was looking to be more proactive as evidenced, he stated, from G8 talks. Bauwens believes since G8, Foreign Ministry is swaying toward Putin's side due to more hard-line statements and FM Lavrov's recent cooperative stance on UN deadline for Iran.

¶5. (SBU) Bauwens said he participated in PM Verhofstadt's meeting with a stoic Ali Larijani. Verhofstadt continued to promote the 5 1 package, but Larijani provided no indication of Iran's leanings. Belgians highlighted the drawbacks for Iran should a UN resolution be adopted. This produced a negative response from Larijani, who said a UNSC resolution would provoke further uncooperative behavior from Iran, primarily especially toward the IAEA.

IMBRIE